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Abstract. This article evaluates the planning process and initial implementation of the Rule of Law 
Mission of the European Union in Kosovo (EULEX). It shows that the original intention was to 
have a smaller presence than the predecessor United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Yet as a 
result of a lack of settlement on the international status of Kosovo, the European Union ended up 
with a robust mandate and it was unable to make a fresh start in order to distinguish itself from the 
United Nations. EULEX has, nonetheless, successfully established itself, but it remains too early for  
a final judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the civil war at the close of the twentieth century (1998–1999), the international status of 
Kosovo  has  divided  the  international  community.  The  five  permanent  members  of  the  United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) were split three to two on whether Kosovo could unilaterally part 
from Serbia.  This  stalemate  in  New York continuously  resulted in  postponement  of  a  political 
dialogue on status, until large scale riots broke out throughout Kosovo in March 2004. Following a 
comprehensive review, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that the situation 
was no longer tenable and he appointed the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as his Special  
Envoy  to  facilitate  final  negotiations  between  Belgrade  and  Pristina  on  status.  Despite  the 
tremendous international pressure on both parties, no settlement was reached in the talks and the 
package  proposed  by  President  Ahtisaari  was  rejected  by  the  Serbian  government.  After  all 
mediation  attempts  had  been  exhausted,  the  Kosovo  Assembly  unilaterally  declared  its 
independence (17 February 2008). It was recognized by most Western states, but not by Serbia, 
Russia and some other 120+ states.1
One of the reasons why the riots in March 2004 got out of hand was that the local politicians had no 
confidence in the United Nations and its Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which had been responsible 
for the rule of law and civil administration following Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 
1999. It was therefore decided that, in the context of the negotiations on the future status of Kosovo,  
the United Nations should hand over its tasks to the local authorities and to the European Union,  
which started planning this new mission from early 2006 onwards. While the EU was ready to take 
responsibility for the situation in Kosovo, it made abundantly clear that its future presence would 
not be a mere continuation of UNMIK. In other words, it would not be ‘EUMIK’ (Solana and Rehn 
2005a, 2005b). The engagement of the European Union would be light and would support local 
authorities rather than replace them. Ownership was the key concept, so that the local population 
1 For the status negotiations see Weller (2008, 2009), Ker-Lindsay (2009a, 2009b), Perritt (2009) and Yannis (2009).
would put pressure on their leaders rather than on international organizations. Eventually, however, 
the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union (EULEX) was given a robust mandate and it could 
not make a fresh start due to the lack of agreement on status and divisiveness among the member 
states.
This  article  evaluates  the  EULEX  planning  process  and  the  initial  implementation  until  the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice (July 2010). It shows that Javier Solana, the EU's 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the time, and the officials in  
the  Council  Secretariat  and  the  Planning Team played  a  critical  role  not  only  in  successfully 
navigating  through the political  minefield,  but  also through clearing day-to-day issues with the 
United Nations.2 They were at the heart of the machinery and the member states, being divided 
themselves,  were  glad  that  at  least  someone  took  care  of  business.  It  proved,  however,  an 
impossible responsibility,  as the technical  rule  of law mission could not overcome the political 
problems surrounding the status of Kosovo. The absence of settlement undermined the planning 
process and affected the launching of the operation after the unilateral declaration of independence. 
Yet despite all these drawbacks, which were largely beyond the European Union, EULEX has been 
able to successfully establish itself. It is, however, too early for a final judgment.
This  article  will  discuss  the  planning  and  initial  implementation  of  EULEX  chronologically 
following the various steps of the policy process. It starts with the agenda-setting phase, which set  
important  parameters  for  the  mission,  including the  need for  a  light  footprint.  Subsequently,  it 
shows how during  the  decision-making phase,  the  member  states  gradually  increased  the  total 
authorized  strength  and  the  scope  of  the  mandate.  During  the  launching  of  the  mission,  the 
European Union was faced with  the  fact  that  UNMIK did  not  want  to  leave  for  political  and  
practical reasons. This resulted in many months of delay with the effect that EULEX was unable to 
make a fresh start. Finally, the article shows that during the implementation of the mission, the 
European Union had to deal on a daily basis with the lack of settlement and that EULEX had to act  
as a ‘status-neutral’ organization, which made its job rather complicated.
AGENDA-SETTING
The Kosovo war formally came to an end with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244, which 
mandated an international  security  presence and an international  civilian presence.  The 60,000-
strong Kosovo Force (KFOR) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was put in charge 
of the security aspects, while the United Nations led the civilian presence through its Mission in 
Kosovo. Under its auspices, a number of tasks were further delegated to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the European Union. The United Nations itself remained in charge of the rule of law 
and civil administration. It was led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations (SRSG), the first office holder being Bernard Kouchner. He was also in charge of 
facilitating the political process on the future status of Kosovo—a not insignificant detail, on which 
Resolution 1244 remained inconclusive (Yannis 2004, Weller 2009).
During  the  first  years  of  UNMIK's  presence,  various  tasks  were  handed  over  to  the  local 
institutions. On status, however, SRSG Michael Steiner noted in front of the Security Council that 
‘Kosovo society and institutions will have to show that they are ready for this process … we must 
make clear what is expected of them’ (quoted in Weller 2008, p. 18). Thus, the United Nations 
established a whole series of benchmarks for Kosovo before the status talks could commence. This 
‘standards-before-status’ policy conveniently bypassed the fact that there was disagreement in the 
Security Council. In March 2004, it became clear that this way of doing business was no longer 
2 The Council Secretariat is formally called the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, see Dijkstra 
(2008, 2010).
tenable when large-scale riots broke out that led to the death of 19 (United Nations 2004, King and 
Mason 2006, Perritt  2009).  Secretary-General  Kofi Annan ordered a  comprehensive review,  on 
which basis he appointed President Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy in charge of the future status 
process for Kosovo (November 2005).
The  European  Union  had  always  been  a  key  actor  with  regard  to  Kosovo.  Through  various 
channels, it had spent some €2 billion in different projects on the ground (Pond 2008, Koeth 2010). 
The United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy were furthermore part of the Contact Group for 
the Western Balkans, which also included the United States and Russia. The EU institutions were 
associated with the work of the Contact Group as well. It is thus little surprise that the European 
Union followed the events in Kosovo closely and that the Council strongly condemned the riots in  
March 2004 by stating that ‘Kosovo's leaders and the [Provisional Institutions of Self-Government] 
must be aware that  what is  at  stake is  their  credibility,  the future of Kosovo and its  European  
perspective. They must act accordingly’ (Council of the European Union 2004, p. 5). The member 
states expressed their full support for the efforts of the United Nations, but decided to send Javier 
Solana to the region nonetheless. He went there two days later, on 24 March 2004.
Local politicians did not unambiguously denounce the riots. Moreover, NATO and UNMIK were 
blamed for letting things run out of control (King and Mason 2006, Ker-Lindsay 2009b, Perritt 
2010). One of the victims of the riots was SRSG Harri Holkeri, who resigned in May 2004. With 
the position vacant, Solana lobbied for Søren Jessen-Petersen, his EU Special Representative to 
Macedonia, to be appointed. He took his seconded EU officials with him to lead UNMIK (June 
2004). The impression of Petersen and his team was that ‘there was a complete lack of confidence 
among the national elite about the United Nations’ (interview with UN official).  The riots took 
place, because the status process was not moving. In this context, Petersen launched a series of 
informal discussions at  the end of 2004 on the future arrangements of Kosovo with the United 
Nations, the European Union, NATO and OSCE. There was a clear agreement amongst these actors 
that  ‘the  UN had to reduce its  presence,  that  the  NATO and OSCE were  staying and that  the 
European Union should raise its profile’ (ibid.). UNMIK would hand over most tasks in the area of 
rule of law to the local authorities and the European Union would take over some of the residual 
tasks  in  this  field.  These  discussions  were  useful,  because  ‘it  became  over  time  conventional 
wisdom that the European Union would go in’ (ibid.).
As part of this review process, Petersen naturally visited Brussels for an exchange of views with the 
member  states  (21  February  2005).  The  ministers  noted  that  since  the  Thessaloniki  European 
Council (June 2003) had reaffirmed the ‘European perspective’ of the Western Balkans, including 
Kosovo, the European Union would have to play a major role in any discussions concerning status. 
They thus ‘invited the [High Representative] and the Commission … to examine with the United 
Nations and other relevant players what might be the future contribution of the European Union to 
the efforts of the international community in Kosovo … and to report back to it on this’ (Council of  
the European Union 2005: 12). Javier Solana and Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, drafted a 
joint report on the Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo (13 June 2005).3 The main strength 
of this report was in the process: the Commission and the Council Secretariat had a common vision 
on the  future  course of  Kosovo.  This  created  a  precedent  for  future  cooperation,  although one 
Commission interviewee noted that ‘Rehn co-signed the papers … the political drive was from the 
Council Secretariat’.
The content of this report was also noteworthy in several respects. Firstly, it stated that ‘the future 
international civilian presence could take the form of an international office with an important EU 
component but cannot be EUMIK’. The role of UNMIK in Kosovo had been compromised by the 
3 This report and subsequent reports by Solana and Rehn are not publicly available, but a summary, from which this 
article quotes, can be found online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/solana [Accessed 14 July 2010].
events in March 2004 and the European Union wanted to make a fresh start. It was also not willing 
to take over the all-encompassing mandate of UNMIK, but preferred to focus on a few specific  
tasks. Thus the report argued, secondly, that ‘core areas will be the protection of minorities and the 
rule of law (police and justice)’. This was completely in line with the earlier informal discussions 
under Petersen, but it was the first time that Solana formally stated that he thought of it as a rule of 
law mission.
The political process regarding the future status of Kosovo formally commenced after the UNSC 
endorsed the appointment of President Ahtisaari as Special Envoy (24 October 2005). The work of 
Ahtisaari was not concluded until March 2007, but the big member states, the Council Secretariat 
and the Commission would stay involved in the whole process (Weller 2009, Perritt 2010). On 6 
December 2005, for example, Solana and Rehn published a second joint report on the future EU 
role and contribution in Kosovo. This report reiterated that, regardless of its future status, Kosovo 
was in need of some international presence and that the EU would play a leading role. Yet again it  
stated clearly that the future international civilian presence would not be EUMIK. In line with the  
previous report, police and rule of law was highlighted as a priority area, which would require the  
support  of  Community  instruments  as  well  as  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP) 
measures. Therefore, ‘contingency planning for a possible ESDP mission on police and rule of law 
should start’ (Solana and Rehn 2005b, p. 2).
The  member  states  agreed  with  this  conclusion  and  mandated  a  joint  Commission–Council 
Secretariat  fact-finding  mission,  which  took  place  from  19  to  27  February  2006.  The  main 
conclusion  of  this  fact-finding  mission  was  that  the  EU  engagement  in  Kosovo  would  be  an 
important endeavour in a difficult political environment, which needed to be carefully planned and 
executed. Thus, it advised the member states to set up a permanent European Union Planning Team 
in Kosovo to ‘ensure that EU decision-making could be based on a solid and well analysed basis 
that is in step with the future status process’ (Council of the European Union 2006, preambular para.  
10). The Planning Team saw the light of day with the adoption of a Council Joint Action (10 April  
2006). About a month later, it was established on the ground. Its legal basis carefully noted that the 
EU Planning Team would not prejudge any subsequent decision by the Union to launch an ESDP 
operation, but the mission was already clearly beginning to take shape.
DECISION-MAKING
The future status of Kosovo was very divisiveness amongst EU member states. The idea that the 
European Union should step up its efforts on the ground less so. On the planning and the content of  
the rule of law mission, there was not too much disagreement between the member states. Firstly,  
because Kosovo was such a divisive dossier, the member states preferred not to talk about it in their  
committees, particularly not in the Political and Security Committee at ambassador level. Instead, 
they  let  the  officials  of  the  Council  Secretariat  and  the  Planning  Team  figure  out  the  details  
(interviews with national and Council Secretariat officials). This became very obvious when they 
tried to quickly adopt all the planning documents in the days before the unilateral declaration of 
independence (17 February 2008). It would no longer be possible to agree on the EULEX mission 
after the changed circumstances on the ground. Secondly, it was quite simply in everyone's interest, 
regardless of status, to have a rule of law mission supporting local authorities in their fight against  
organized crime and corruption. To avoid endless discussions over status among the member states, 
EULEX became a technical, status neutral, mission. The main question during the decision-making 
phase was how to agree to the deployment of EULEX without an agreement on status.
The status discussions, however, did have an impact on the planning of the EULEX mission. The 
main assumption from the beginning was that the Serbian and Kosovo authorities would reach a 
settlement  in  the political  dialogue led by President  Ahtisaari  (interviews with various Council 
Secretariat  and EULEX officials).  Such agreement,  it  was then assumed,  would lead to  a  new 
resolution by the UNSC replacing Resolution 1244. Whether this was a realistic assumption or not,  
it was for political reasons not relevant. The European Union could simply not adopt documents in 
their committees on the basis of a political disagreement. Therefore, it did not have a Plan B for a  
very long time, describing what the European Union would do in case of a lack of a new Security 
Council  Resolution.  The  fact  that  it  did  not  have  such  contingency  plans  created  tremendous 
problems during the launching of the mission (see below).
On the assumption that there would be a settlement, the European Union Planning Team, consisting 
initially of 12 staff members, deployed to Pristina in May 2006. At that point in time, the Planning 
Team expected  the  Ahtisaari  negotiations  to  conclude  late  2006/early  2007 (Grevi  2009).  This 
meant that the European Union would deploy its mission in the summer of 2007. The Planning 
Team was initially engaged in a lot of ‘mind-clearing’ about what it was going to do. The state of 
the art of the local police, justice and the customs services was unclear and the mission had to 
establish benchmarks on what it wanted to achieve. Over the summer of 2006, specialists in the 
fields of police, justice and customs—the future three components of the mission—arrived bringing 
the total number of staff members up to 35. They started the planning process. In Brussels, the  
bureaucratic structures remained small. In the Council Secretariat, for example, one policy official 
and two police officers worked on the technical planning of the mission.
Apart from the assumption of settlement, many of the parameters had already been spelled out for 
the European Union Planning Team. President Ahtisaari's deputy, Albert Rohan, for example, had 
noted that the future civilian international presence in Kosovo should be ‘as light as possible and as  
robust as necessary’ (UNOSEK 2006). This was in line with the Solana/Rehn reports. The Planning 
Team was thus looking at options with a very light footprint. In an options paper of 26 September  
2006, for example, it made clear that the Union should take over only a number of specific tasks 
from UNMIK in the field of rule of law. Many other tasks in the area of rule of law could be 
delegated to the local authorities. Moreover,  the Planning Team stated that the European Union 
should not take over tasks in the field of civil administration, because it does not have the right tools  
for such a purpose. The customs services were, however, included as levies made up 60–70 per cent 
of the Kosovo government budget. Without these revenues, police services and the judiciary could 
no longer be paid. Thus it was seen as an area of vital importance to future stability. On this basis, 
the Planning Team presented three options (light, medium, robust) (interviews with EULEX and 
UN officials, Grevi 2009).
The light option was the preferred option. The European Union would deploy 800–850 international 
staff members and engage mainly in monitoring, mentoring and advising the local authorities. The 
total number would break down to 100–150 officials at the headquarters, 300–350 police officers 
engaged in non-executive functions, about 60–80 executive police officers working on a limited 
number of tasks, 200–225 police officers as part of the integrated police units dealing with riot  
control and civil disturbance, some 30 judges and prosecutors in total and only 15 customs officers 
(interview EULEX official). An interviewee noted with regard to the light footprint that the ‘initial 
idea was to change the UNMIK vehicle into a Smart. UNMIK had been omnipresent; there was a  
need for discretion’ (UN official). It needs to be stressed though that this light option was only 
possible given the assumption of settlement with full consent of the Serbian minorities and Kosovo 
Albanians. The proposed number of customs officers, for example, was clearly not enough in case 
of disagreement over the border between Serbia and Kosovo.
When it became obvious over time that there would not be an agreement on status, this light option 
was no longer credible and the member states started to strengthen the mission (interviews with 
various national, Council Secretariat, EULEX and UN officials). The medium option was discussed,  
which foresaw that EULEX would take over from UNMIK the Polish and Romanian integrated 
police units in addition to the French and Italian ones (bringing the total up to 450). This option also 
included a competence for EULEX to deal with property-related law suits, which meant the need 
for more civil judges, more prosecutors and more legal officers. Finally, however, the member states  
accepted the robust option, which included a much stronger customs presence at the borders (up to 
60 staff members), an increase in the number of executive police tasks, and a much higher number 
of judges, prosecutors and legal officers (total 300). This brought the total authorized strength of the 
EULEX mission to more than 1,800 international staff members. For the member states an increase 
in numbers seemed the best way to guarantee stability. A number of observers, however, argued that 
EULEX is doing too much and that it is effectively a continuation of UNMIK in the area of rule of 
law. For instance, the police component of UNMIK had a strength of approximately 2,000 (United 
Nations 2007), which is not significantly larger than the 1,400 of EULEX.
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  increases  were  accepted  over  time,  as  the  political  process 
continued.  Already at  an early stage,  the Planning Team sent  a  Crisis  Management Concept to 
Brussels, which is the first formal planning document. It was adopted by the member states on 11 
December 2006. On this basis the Council Secretariat and the Planning Team issued the Concept of  
Operations on 24 January 2007 with the first discussions taking place in the Committee for Civilian  
Aspects of Crisis Management.  In the partially declassified minutes,  it  is stated that during the 
meeting ‘it was stressed that a final [Concept of Operations] cannot be adopted until after the UNSC 
Resolution, but that it  was important to proceed as far as possible at this time’ (Council of the 
European  Union  2007).  These  discussions  over  the  Concept  of  Operations  continued  during 
February  and  March  and  the  final  staff  numbers  were  left  open-ended,  so  that  they  could  be 
adjusted at a later stage. With regard to the formal planning process, it is also important to note that 
the  member  states  were  thus  already  working  on the  Concept  of  Operations  long  before  they 
adopted the formal legal  basis,  Joint  Action,  in February 2008. The Joint  Action was the most 
contested document (see also below) and the EU had to prepare all planning documents in time for 
the final declaration of independence.
Another novelty was that the member states designated Yves de Kermabon as the future Head of 
Mission on 4 May 2007, which is normally also done through the Joint Action. His salary was paid 
for  through  a  so-called  preparatory  measure,  which  was  the  first  of  its  kind  as  well.  The 
appointment of de Kermabon was, of course, part of the political process, yet it was noteworthy that 
he was a retired French Lieutenant General, who had previously been a KFOR Commander (2004–
2005). He thus brought with him lots of experience on how to deal with executive missions and 
chain of command issues, which was new territory for civilian ESDP. He was furthermore familiar 
with  the  local  politicians,  with  whom he  held  some  authority  as  a  former  NATO officer.  De 
Kermabon remained in Brussels until the official launch of EULEX in the summer of 2008. He was 
thus not part of the Planning Team. In Brussels, he started working on the Operational Plan. At this 
point, there were already 17 people in the Council Secretariat planning the Kosovo mission.
One of the main points about the planning process was that lower-level civil servants in the Council 
Secretariat and the Planning Team partially had to invent civilian crisis management along the way. 
They received precious little support from the member states and control was limited (interviews 
with national, Council Secretariat and EULEX officials). This was mainly because member states 
did not want to deal with this specific dossier and because the junior diplomats in committee did not 
have the adequate expertise to plan such a major and innovative operation. A Council Secretariat 
official recalls that ‘most of the time [the member states] did not want to hear it. They did not want 
to have Kosovo on the agenda, because they knew they would be divided … you tend to prefer to 
talk about subjects where you agree and not about subjects you disagree’. On many topics, the civil  
servants in the Council Secretariat and the Planning Team had to make their own decisions. With 
regard  to  the  total  authorized  strength  of  the  operation,  however,  the  member  states  played  a 
significant role through strengthening the integrated police units and increasing the number of the 
executive tasks. The mission thus eventually did not become the light type of operation that Javier 
Solana had wanted.
President Ahtisaari finally concluded his work on the international status of Kosovo on 26 March 
2007. He proposed ‘supervised independence’ given the exceptional historical circumstances, which 
allowed Kosovo to part from Serbia. The international community would remain involved through a 
Civilian Representative (ICR) with strong ‘corrective powers’, an international military presence of 
NATO, the  OSCE mission,  and the  ESDP operation  of  the  European Union.  The International 
Civilian Representative would be distinct from the ESDP operation and would be supported by the 
International  Civilian  Office.4 It  was  also  proposed  that,  following  the  Bosnian  model,  the 
International Civilian Representative would be the same person as the EU Special Representative to 
Kosovo in a double-hatting agreement (Weller 2009, Perritt 2010). Not surprisingly, Serbia rejected 
the ‘Ahtisaari package’. After Russia blocked a number of new Security Council resolutions (July 
2007),  Solana  proposed  to  continue  negotiations  in  the  context  of  the  Contact  Group.  These 
negotiations became known as the Troika talks and consisted of the two parties and representatives 
from the United States, the European Union and Russia.
With Russia blocking the process in the UNSC, it became increasingly clear that there would not be 
a new resolution. As a result, the EULEX Planning Team started working internally on contingency 
planning from the summer of 2007 onwards. It circulated a timeline in mid-September, which gave 
an overview of  the  subsequent  steps  to  be taken in  case  of  no new resolution.  Following this 
timeline, the European Union would prepare the EULEX mission before the unilateral declaration 
of  independence.  After  the  declaration,  the  United  Nations  Secretary-General  would  decide  to 
withdraw UNMIK ‘due to  exceptional  circumstances’,  thus making the path ready for EULEX 
deployment.  This timeline  was discussed  with the United Nations Department  of Peacekeeping 
Operations, but it was, of course, not shared with the members of the Security Council as part of the 
political negotiations. With hindsight, it went almost exactly as planned, although with much more 
delay than anticipated.
The Troika talks in the end only bought the international community (particularly the European 
Union) time to plan its subsequent steps. Its work was concluded without result on 10 December.  
The European Council of Heads of State and Government noted four days later ‘that the negotiating 
process facilitated by the Troika between the parties on Kosovo's future status has been exhausted’ 
(European Council  2007, para.  66).  This opened the way for  the final unilateral  declaration of 
independence and gave the EU institutions the green light for planning to move ahead as soon as 
possible. At the end of January 2008, the Council Secretariat issued the Joint Action, which became 
the legal basis of the mission, and the Concept of Operations. Both were adopted by the member 
states  on  4  February.  In  parallel,  the  member  states  appointed  Pieter  Feith  as  the  EU Special  
Representative to Kosovo and he would thus also become the International Civilian Representative. 
Four days later,  the Secretariat also issued the Operational  Plan,  which was adopted by silence 
procedure on 16 February 2008. Now that the European Union had agreed on the EULEX mission, 
the local authorities were free to declare their independence, which the Kosovo Assembly did the 
next day.
While none of the member states had problems with a technical rule of law mission in principle, the 
adoption  of  the  Joint  Action  was  nonetheless  problematic.  As  the  only  public  legally  binding 
document of the European Union, a number of member states—in particular Cyprus, Romania and 
Spain—took great care in ensuring that the Joint Action would not amount to a de facto recognition 
of Kosovo. These matters were only resolved in the days before the adoption of the Joint Action 
(interview Council Secretariat official). At the last moment, however, Cyprus decided that while it  
would not block the EULEX mission, it would make use of the constructive abstention provisions 
4 For the complicated relations between EU actors on the ground, see Koeth (2010).
in the EU Treaties in order to avoid any possible linkage between the Joint Action and status. Yet it 
is important to reiterate that this abstention had nothing to do with the mandate and the content of 
the  mission.  Cyprus  had,  after  all,  accepted  the  European  Council  Presidency  Conclusions  in 
December 2007, which referred to the EULEX mission (para. 70). It had also stated that it might 
make officials available for EULEX. Finally, Cyprus did not have major problems with the other 
non-public planning documents (interview Council Secretariat official).
The key point was thus that the member states finished the political  agreement on the EULEX 
operation and the complete planning process before the unilateral declaration of independence. It 
was felt that the member states would not be able to agree on a number of status-related details after 
the declaration of independence. This proved exactly right. While the United States and the four 
European members of the Contract Group (United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy) directly 
recognized Kosovo in a concerted action, a notable number of member states did not, and some 
even opposed the declaration of independence. Yet the EULEX mission was status-neutral and it 
was in the end supported by all the member states. A last detail of the problems surrounding status 
was  that  the  European  Union  could  not  sign  a  Status  of  Mission  Agreement  with  the  local  
authorities.  Instead,  the  Kosovo  authorities  and  UNMIK (being  the  legitimate  authority  under 
Resolution 1244) unilaterally stated that all  the personnel of EULEX would receive  diplomatic 
immunity.
LAUNCHING OF THE MISSION
The member states decided already in December 2006 that the EU Planning Team would become 
the core of the future operation. Joint Action 2006/918/CFSP authorized the Planning Team to start 
recruiting personnel ‘in view of [EULEX's] rapid deployment’, for which purpose it was asked to 
issue a deployment plan (article 2(5)). Until mid-2008, the Planning Team remained the core around 
which the mission was built. Many of the officials from the Planning Team eventually joined the  
mission, often as deputies to the newly recruited heads of departments/components. Roy Reeve, the 
Head of the Planning Team since December 2007, for example, became Deputy Head of Mission 
under  General  de  Kermabon.  As  such,  much  of  the  expertise,  which  the  Planning  Team  had 
accumulated over more than two years, remained in the mission. The Planning Team grew over 
these years from the initial 12 staff members to over 120 officials at the unilateral declaration of 
independence (February 2008).
Gradually building up the mission through increasing the number of personnel was one thing, the 
political conundrum around the status question quite another. As mentioned above, the Planning 
Team had worked out a scenario and timeline, in case there was no new resolution on the future of 
Kosovo, which stated that UNMIK would withdraw ‘due to exceptional circumstances’. This had 
been cleared with the United Nations and it was the expectation in the European Union that it was  
supported by the leadership in New York as well as on the ground. Yet it turned out that the United 
Nations (1) could not leave Kosovo and (2) that the staff on the ground did not want to leave 
Kosovo. The first point was very political. Following the declaration of independence and the entry 
into force of the new Kosovo Constitution that no longer referred to UNMIK, Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon wrote—according to  plan—to members of  the Security  Council  that ‘the United 
Nations is confronting a new reality in Kosovo, with operational implications for UNMIK that it 
must take into account’ (United Nations 2008a, para. 10) (12 June 2008). He also noted that ‘Serbia  
and the Kosovo Serbs have indicated that they would find an enhanced operational role for the 
European Union in the area of the rule of law acceptable, provided that such activities would be 
undertaken under the overall status-neutral authority of the United Nations’ (para. 12).
Yet this was precisely the problem. The Kosovo Albanians no longer recognized UNMIK and the 
European Union was not going to report  to the UNSC. In the months that followed, there was 
intensive consultation with the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and the relevant parties. Both the 
United  Nations  Department  for  Peacekeeping  Operations  and  the  Legal  Service  informed  the 
European  Union  that  the  Secretary-General  was  in  a  position  to  reconfigure  UNMIK  without 
approval by the Security Council (interview Council Secretariat official). The Secretary-General, 
however, followed his own timetable, despite various diplomatic demarches by the EU member 
states.  Meanwhile,  on the  ground the  SRSG mediated  between the  authorities  in  Belgrade  and 
Pristina. Serbia came up with six specific demands. These ‘six points' were rejected by Kosovo, yet 
included in  the  report  of  the  Secretary-General  to  the  Security  Council  of  24 November  2008 
(United  Nations  2008b,  Sabovic  2009).  Kosovo  eventually  gave  in.  UNMIK  would  keep  a 
significant presence in Kosovo, although focusing on more political  tasks. The European Union 
would be in charge of rule of law via EULEX and it would send a short quarterly report to the  
United Nations Secretary-General, which would then be included as an annex of his report to the 
Security  Council.  These negotiations  in New York and on the  ground, needless to  say,  created 
problems  with  the  deployment  of  EULEX.  In  the  summer  of  2008  there  were  sincere  doubts 
whether EULEX would indeed continue and the recruitment of new personnel was temporarily put 
on hold (interview with various EULEX officials).
The second problem was that many of the staff members of UNMIK did not want to leave, because 
it would mean the end of their contracts. One interviewee of the United Nations noted that ‘people 
were trying to hold on to their unit. We asked all units which tasks they could hand over to the local  
authorities in terms of the transition. A number of the units came with good overviews, but many 
units simply refused to hand over any tasks’. An official from the Council Secretariat similarly 
recalls that ‘we had the feeling … that because the [United Nations] had told us that they wanted to 
withdraw … we took it for granted that they wanted to go. We discovered that … the people on the 
ground in Kosovo, they really did not want to go away’.  One national official  was even more 
outspoken: ‘the problem with UNMIK is that it  is still  full of Russians, who are systematically 
sabotaging the whole project … they are doing difficult on the instruction of Moscow’.
The  political  problem  regarding  the  withdrawal  of  UNMIK  combined  with  the  local  issue  of 
UNMIK staff not wanting to give up their jobs created tremendous logistical difficulties for the 
deployment of EULEX. In order to save costs for both UNMIK and EULEX, it had been agreed in  
advance that the European Union would take over many vehicles and buildings from the United 
Nations. Yet now that UNMIK would continue to have a substantial presence in Kosovo, it could no 
longer hand over all  the vehicles and buildings that it  had promised. As a result,  the European  
Union had to start lengthy procurement procedures for cars and find new buildings, which were in 
short supply in Pristina. One very senior EULEX official noted that he became ‘Kosovo's leading 
expert on how to get hold of second hand cars and four-wheel drives’. A Council Secretariat official  
recalled spending one week per month in New York during the summer of 2008 negotiating with 
UN officials over lists of cars and then finding out that the UNMIK people on the ground had 
different preferences. ‘That was nightmarish.’
These logistical issues also had financial consequences. After all, the European Union had budgeted 
on the basis that EULEX would buy used cars, which was cheaper than when it had to buy new 
cars. Yet the mission was already under financial constraints and the member states could not go 
back to the European Parliament and ask for more money. EULEX thus not only ran into problems 
with  UNMIK,  but  also  with  the  European  Commission,  which  administers  the  budget.  These 
financial issues were finally resolved as a result of the delay in the deployment of the mission: the  
per diems to staff members were eventually significantly lower than budgeted. This made up for the 
gap (interview with Commission official). This was not an easy period for EULEX, which was 
trying to get its mission off the ground.
Finally, the recruitment of personnel created problems for EULEX. As there were long delays in the 
deployment, many of the identified staff members had already moved on to new jobs (including in 
parallel missions in Afghanistan and Georgia) and were no longer available. Their posts thus had to 
be filled again. This issue was particularly urgent with the judiciary. While it has become common 
practice to send policemen on international missions, it does not fit into the career paths of judges 
and prosecutors to go abroad. EULEX also had to recruit rather senior staff members, because the  
cases are generally complicated and politically sensitive. Because of the high security restrictions 
life as a judge in Kosovo is not particularly pleasant. As a result, there continues to be a shortage of 
judges and prosecutors among EULEX staff. The last major difficulty was with the recruitment of 
the 1,000 local staff members, which have to be screened intensively. Therefore EULEX had to 
establish a human resources department with around 50 staff members in Pristina.
Agreement  was  finally  reached  in  the  Security  Council  on  26  November  2008  on  the 
reconfiguration  of  UNMIK, after  the  Serbian foreign minister  gave  the green  light  stating that 
EULEX could deploy all over Kosovo (interview with UN official). Only three weeks later, after a 
short period of intense preparations, UNMIK handed over control of Kosovo to EULEX. EULEX 
declared Initial Operating Capability on 9 December 2008 and immediately started its operations, 
including in Northern Kosovo, through deploying police agents to all local police stations (Sabovic 
2009). During the 120-day transition period, EULEX overcame many of the logistical challenges, 
which resulted from the fact that UNMIK did not fully withdraw. Due to all the good efforts of its 
staff members, it was capable of declaring full operating capability on time (6 April 2009).
INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION
At the time of writing (July 2010), EULEX Kosovo had been fully operational for more than a year.  
In its first year it has established itself and made some progress through its pragmatic incremental 
approach. The mandate of EULEX includes non-executive tasks, executive tasks and riot control 
through its integrated police units (Council of the European Union 2008, article 3). Non-executive 
tasks concern the monitoring, mentoring and advising of the local police, judiciary and customs 
services. Executive tasks include functions carried out by EULEX staff themselves, such as the 
fight against (high-level) organized crime or court rulings by EULEX judges. This section of the  
article  discusses the progress of EULEX in the fields of police,  justice and customs separately. 
Particularly  in  the  area  of  police,  it  has  contributed  towards  professionalizing  the  local  police 
services, based on precedents set by UNMIK, and it has already handed over a number of executive 
responsibilities to local authorities. While real progress in the judiciary and customs services still 
has to be achieved, EULEX has also made important first steps in these fields. In its everyday work, 
however, it time and again experiences the political difficulties resulting from the conundrum still 
surrounding the  international  status of  Kosovo and the  fact  that  the  EU member states  remain 
divided on the issue. A final political settlement will eventually remain a requirement to establish a 
well-functioning rule of law sector in Kosovo. EULEX, as a technical mission,  can only do so  
much.
With regard to its non-executive tasks, EULEX has been most successful in the field of the police, 
partially because it could build on progress already achieved by UNMIK and the OSCE. Through 
co-location, it has policemen at every police station, which allows EULEX to intensively monitor, 
mentor and advise local police. An early highlight was when almost all police agents with a Serbian 
background returned to  work in  June 2009 after  having refused to  perform their  duties for  16 
months following the unilateral declaration of independence (Reuters 2009). They understood that 
the  local  Serbian  minorities  benefited  from  their  presence.  Their  return  was  the  result  of 
negotiations between the European Union and the Serbian government. An important indicator of 
the professionalism of the local police is how they dealt with the elections in November 2009. One 
national interviewee recalled that ‘they handled the local elections very well, which they did on 
their  own. They were not very visible, but they were there.  It  was very professional’. This has 
increased confidence in the local police services, which is partly to the credit of EULEX.
In the field of police, EULEX also made its one and only big mistake. For effective policing, it is  
essential to exchange information with the neighbouring states. Organized crime, after all, typically 
does not respect  borders.  Serbia  and Kosovo jointly  have a stake in tackling this problem. Yet 
because the countries cannot do business with one another due to the recognition issues, EULEX 
had  to  negotiate  the  practical  details  with  Serbia  in  the  context  of  a  police  protocol.  These 
negotiations were badly communicated to the local  population,  and even discouraged by Pieter 
Feith as the EU Special Representative (interview with Council Secretariat official), which led to 
nationalist upheaval by the local Kosovo politicians, who were claiming that the territorial integrity 
of Kosovo was not respected. The end of the story was that EULEX lost a lot of credit with the  
local population since it does not wholeheartedly support their cause because it is status neutral, and 
that it had to postpone similar protocols on justice and customs. Within the European Union it also 
led to confusion and great concern about the operation.
On the executive policing front, the developments have been more positive. Firstly, the integrated 
police units have performed their de-escalation functions well. Following protocol, local Kosovo 
police provide the first  response to riots and civil  disturbance. If they are unable to handle the 
situation, EULEX police can provide the second response. When, however, the civil disturbance 
gets out of hand and turns into para-military violence NATO stands ready as a third responder. So 
far, there have been two cases in which the integrated police units, backed up by NATO forces, had 
to intervene. The first concerned a conflict over property in Northern Kosovo and the Kosovo Serb 
police  did  not  want  to  engage  (August  2009).  The  second  case  was  over  the  local  Serbian 
municipality  elections in Northern Kosovo (May 2010). The joint EULEX–NATO interventions 
were effective. Apart from civil disturbance, EULEX police also has a role in other executive tasks,  
such as the fight against organized crime, witness protection and war crimes. Over time, it wants to 
hand  over  these  tasks  to  the  local  police  services,  which  it  has  already  done  in  the  area  of 
counterterrorism. Kosovo police are willing to take over more tasks, which they see as a sign of 
confidence, yet EULEX has been reluctant so far when it comes to organized crime and high-level  
corruption.
While the executive tasks in the area of the police are rather specific and clearly separate from the  
monitoring, mentoring and advising tasks, in the judiciary they are broader in scope and closely 
intertwined  with  the  non-executive  tasks.  In  cases  of  organized  crime,  high-level  political 
corruption and war crimes, EULEX judges are on mixed panels with local judges. Also in civil trails 
that  have  to  do  with  property-related  disputes,  EULEX  judges  are  involved,  because  of  their 
sensitive  nature.  One of the major problems that EULEX encountered in the judiciary was the 
enormous backlog of 1,800 open cases left by UNMIK many going back to 1999/2000 (interview 
with EULEX official). EULEX immediately decided to close 400 cases due to a lack of evidence 
and little change on future positive developments. Of the remaining cases, which were ready for 
trial, EULEX managed to conclude most of them within the first year of operations. This was a 
major achievement. EULEX has also made incremental progress by putting its own judges on the 
Mitrovica District Court in Northern Kosovo after it had been ransacked by local gangs. EULEX 
eventually managed to persuade the support staff of this courthouse to return to work. Negotiations 
on the  return of local  judges are  still  ongoing.  Finally,  EULEX has got  involved in  high-level  
corruption cases at the Ministry of Transport and the Central Bank. While investigations have not 
yet been concluded, such activism was praised by the local population.
Within the area of customs, progress has been as incremental as in the judiciary. As customs have to 
do with borders, this was always the most politically sensitive area. This was emphasized by the 
fact that Serbian minorities burned down the two gatehouses between Serbia and Kosovo directly 
following the declaration of independence. EULEX did deploy its customs officers to these gates 
shortly after declaring its Initial Operating Capability, yet initially they did nothing. In the summer 
of 2009, EULEX started copying the commercial  documents of truck drivers. This led to some 
protest, but EULEX shared these documents with the Serbian and Kosovo authorities. Despite the 
fact that it was only copying documents, customs revenues at these two gates went up by 80 per  
cent. What is more, the Serbian government decided to fire some 70 of its own customs officers on 
the basis of smuggling (interview with EULEX official). It thus became obvious that these activities 
of EULEX were beneficial for both parties.
CONCLUSION
This article has given an overview of the mission planning process and the initial implementation of 
EULEX Kosovo. It has shown that the absence of a settlement on the international status of Kosovo 
had  significant  effects  on  what  is  regarded  as  a  technical,  status-neutral,  operation.  While  the 
judgment  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  has  removed  another  obstacle  on  the  road  to 
statehood, it did not have an immediate effect on the daily operation of EULEX. What comes to the  
fore is a clear disconnect between the main planning assumptions and the political realities of the 
status talks. For a very long time, the civil servants in the Council Secretariat and the Planning 
Team prepared options on the basis that both parties would come to an agreement, that there would 
be a new Security Council Resolution, and that the UNMIK would voluntarily leave Kosovo. All of  
these assumptions eventually proved wrong. As a result, the European Union deployed a mission 
with a much more robust mandate than it had initially envisaged, it could not take over assets and 
personnel of the United Nations, and it could not make the fresh start to sufficiently distinguish 
itself from the predecessor mission.
What is interesting about the mission is also the strong personal involvement of Javier Solana, the 
officials in the Council Secretariat and the Planning Team. They were at the heart of the EU Foreign 
Policy machinery and they were taking the lead as regards the planning. This had partially to do 
with Solana's personal background. As a former NATO Secretary-General, he had been in charge of 
the  air  campaign  in  1999  and  he  had  paid  attention  ever  since.  His  first  formal  trip  as  High 
Representative was to Kosovo. Yet perhaps at least as relevant was the disagreement amongst the 
member states. They left the leadership roles to Solana, the Council Secretariat and the Planning 
Team. This way, they could also more easily treat the EULEX mission as separate from the status 
talks.  Throughout  the  planning process,  however,  it  sometimes  seemed  that  the  member  states 
hoped that agreement on the mission would help them to overcome the disagreement in terms of 
status. This was wishful thinking: the technical mission could not solve the political problems.
Despite all the setbacks in terms of planning and the launching of the missions, this article has 
shown that EULEX has relatively successfully established itself. Its pro-active approach to solve 
problems  distinguishes  it  from UNMIK,  which  saw itself  more  as  a  replacement  of  the  local 
institutions and thus had little incentive to build a state. In the field of police, in particular, EULEX 
has improved the quality of the local authorities, as evidenced by the local elections in November  
2009.  The  results  achieved  by  EULEX are,  however,  not  enough.  Particularly  in  the  field  of 
customs and the judiciary, it still had to take on various serious challenges, most of which relate to 
status questions. Furthermore, given the overall ‘Balkan fatigue’ in the European Union, EULEX 
needs continuous progress—the status quo is not sufficient. In the next few years, it needs to hand 
over more tasks to the local authorities to foster a sense of ownership and it will have to gradually 
reduce its own footprint.
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